PUBLIC, EDUCATIONAL, AND GOVERNMENTAL
ACCESS ON CABLE TELEVISION: A MODEL TO
ASSURE REASONABLE ACCESS TO THE
INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY FOR ALL
PEOPLE IN FULFILIAENT OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT GUARANTEE OF FREE SPEECHJames N. Horwood*
INTRODUCTION

In developing a legal or regulatory regime for the Information
Superhighway, it is necessary to provide the means for all people to
have reasonable access to new communication systems. This access
is often referred to as universal service, a concept that had its origin in telephone service. In the telephone context, universal service has meant extending wires to every business and residence,
and perhaps making a telephone instrument available to every
home. With advanced telecommunication systems requiring more
sophisticated instruments, such as personal computers, and training in their use, meaningful universal service will mean substantial
investment, both for equipment and for training. One model that
should be considered, which has been successful in many communities in the context of cable television, is public, educational, and
governmental (PEG) access. This model not only provides a vehicle to achieve universal service, but also provides a forum for those
without ready access to dominant or mainstream media to communicate electronically, in fulfillment of the First Amendment guarantee of free speech.
I.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Cable television access channels date back to the 1960s when,
in an effort to "create a more direct right of access to the video
media," local governments began requiring cable operators to prot An earlier version of this Article was delivered at a symposium entitled Travelling
the Information Superhighway, Communications Law and Regulation in the Twenty-First
Century on November 17, 1994, at the Seton Hall University School of Law.
* Partner, Spiegel & McDiarmid, Washington, D.C.; University of Pennsylvania,
B.S. in Econ. 1958, LL.B. 1961. Mr. Horwood serves on the Board of the Alliance for
Community Media.

1413

1414

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:1413

vide channels for PEG access as a condition of franchise approval.1
These communities saw "cable as the next public forum," which,
like "public parks, libraries, theaters, and other public fora[,] ...
2
encourage, or at least permit speech."
In enacting the 1984 Cable Act,' Congress expressly enabled
franchising authorities to require a cable operator to set aside
channels for PEG access and to require facilities and equipment
for access use.4 The report of the House Energy and Commerce
Committee accompanying the bill that became the 1984 Cable Act
explained:
One of the greatest challenges over the years in establishing
communications policy has been assuring access to the electronic media by people other than the licensees or owners of
those media.... A requirement of reasonable third-party access

to cable systems will mean a wide diversity of information
sources for the public-the fundamental goal of the First
Amendment-without the need to regulate the content of programming provided over cable.
Almost all recent franchise agreements provide for access
by local governments, schools, and non-profit and community
groups over so-called "PEG" . . . channels. Public access chan-

nels are often the video equivalent of the speaker's soap box or
the electronic parallel to the printed leaflet. They provide
groups and individuals who generally have not had access to the
electronic media with the opportunity to become sources of information in the electronic marketplace of ideas. PEG channels
also contribute to an informed citizenry by bringing local
schools into the home, and by showing the public local government at work. 5
Federal activity dealing with PEG access started in 1968 when
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) initiated
rulemaking proceedings that led to regulations adopted in 1972.
Those regulations required cable systems in the largest one hundred markets (1) to have at least twenty channels of capacity, (2) to
reserve three access channels for free use by public, educational,
and governmental bodies, and (3) to reserve one channel for com1 DANIEL L. BRENNER & MONROE

BROADCAST VIDEO §

E. P~icE, CABLE

TELEVISION AND OTHER NON-

6.04[1], at 6-32 (1994).

Id.
s Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779
2

(1984) [hereinafter 1984 Cable Act].
4 See 1984 Cable Act § 611, 47 U.S.C. § 531 (1988).
5 H.R. REP. No. 934,98th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CA.N.
4655, 4667.
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mercial leased access.6 The FCC modified and somewhat reduced
those requirements in 1976. 7 On appeal of the 1976 Report, the
FCC's access regulations were found to be unlawful because they
imposed a common carrier obligation that was not within the
FCC's statutory power.'
II.
A.

PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF THE

1984

AND

1992

CABLE ACTS

PEG Access May be Required in Franchises

The 1984 Cable Act permits, but does not mandate, franchising authorities to require that "channel capacity be designated for
public, educational, or governmental use, and channel capacity on
institutional networks be designated for educational and governmental use, and [to] require rules and procedures for the use of
[such] channel capacity."9 The 1984 Act goes on to provide that
franchising authorities may enforce any franchise requirements regarding the provision or use of PEG capacity. This delegation "includes the authority to enforce any provisions of the franchise for
services, facilities, or equipment proposed by the cable operator
which relate to public, educational, or governmental use of channel capacity."1 ° The section dealing with PEG access concludes by
providing: "Subject to section 624(d) [(47 U.S.C. § 544(d))], a
cable operator shall not exercise editorial control over any [PEG]
use of channel capacity provided pursuant to this section."1 ' Section 624(d) (47 U.S.C. § 544(d)) allows for a franchising authority
and a cable operator to specify in a franchise "that certain cable
services shall not be provided or shall be provided subject to conditions, if such cable services are obscene or are otherwise unprotected by the Constitution of the United States." 2
Congress subsequently revisited and significantly revised the
6 Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 190-91 affid on recon., 36
F.C.C.2d 326 (1972).

7 Cable TV Channel Capacity and Access Requirements, 59 F.C.C.2d 294, 327-29
recon. denied, 62 F.C.C.2d 399 (1976).
8 FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 708-09 (1979).
9 1984 Cable Act § 611(b), 47 U.S.C. § 531(b) (1988). As discussed infra at text
accompanying note 133, an open question exists, however, as to whether the United
States Constitution requires that access (particularly public access) be made available
on cable systems; another open question is whether it is constitutionally permissible
for a franchising authority to require educational and/or governmental access without also providing for public access. See infra notes 130-37 and accompanying text for
a discussion of this issue.
10 1984 Cable Act § 611(c), 47 U.S.C. § 531(c) (1988).
11 1984 Cable Act § 611(e), 47 U.S.C. § 531(e) (1988).
12 1984 Cable Act § 624(d), 47 U.S.C. 544(d) (1988).
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1984 Cable Act; enacting the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992." The major changes brought
about by the 1992 Act were to largely re-regulate cable rates and to
implement mandatory "must-carry" provisions for television broadcast stations electing carriage. The 1992 Cable Act did not amend
the provisions of the 1984 Act that authorized franchising authorities to require cable operators to provide channels for PEG access.
The 1992 Act, however, added several provisions regarding PEG
access. First, the 1992 Act requires that the basic tier subject to rate
regulation include "[a]ny public, educational, and governmental
access programming required by the franchise of the cable system
to be provided to subscribers." 4 Second, the 1992 Act explicitly
stated that, "[i]n awarding a franchise, the franchising authority
...may require adequate assurance that the cable operator will
provide adequate public, educational, and governmental access
channel capacity, facilities, or financial support."15 Finally, and
most importantly, section 10 of the 1992 Act added censorship provisions that would deprive programmers and viewers of access
channels of their right of free speech on such channels.
B.

Censorship Provisions of the 1992 Cable Act

Section 10 of the 1992 Cable Act, substantially limiting the
free speech assurances under the 1984 Act, required the FCC to
adopt regulations designed (1) to restrict access by children to indecent programming on leased 6 channels and (2) to permit cable
operators to prohibit the use of PEG access facilities for any programming "which contains obscene material, sexually explicit conduct, or material soliciting or promoting unlawful conduct."1 7
Section 10 overrides provisions in the 1984 Act that forbade cable
operators from "exercis[ing] any editorial control over any" PEG
programming provided over any access channel. 8 Under the 1984
Act, the person presenting programming on an access channel was
liable for the content of such programming to the extent that it
violated federal, state, or local laws, but cable operators were exPub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 Cable Act].
1992 Cable Act, sec. 3, § 623(b) (7) (A) (ii), 106 Stat. 1460, 1467 (1992) (codified
as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 543(b)(7)(A)(ii) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
15 1992 Cable Act, sec. 7, § 621(a) (4), 106 Stat. 1460, 1483 (1992) (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(4) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
16 Section 612 of the 1984 Act requires cable operators to designate a small portion of their channel capacity for commercial use by persons unaffiliated with the
operator. 1984 Cable Act § 612, 47 U.S.C. 532 (1988).
17 1992 Cable Act, sec. 10, 106 Stat. 1460, 1486 (1992).
18 See 1984 Cable Act §§ 611(e), 612(c)(2), 47 U.S.C. §§ 531(e), 532(c)(2) (1988).
13
14
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plicitly exempted from liability for programming by others carried
on access channels. 9 The 1992 Act removed cable operators' statutory exemption for programming on access channels that "involves obscene material." The FCC issued separate censorship
regulations pursuant to the 1992 Cable Act for commercial leased
access and PEG access.2 °
The PEG access regulations, which have been stayed, state:
Any cable operator may prohibit the use on its system of
any channel capacity of any public, educational, or governmental access facility for any programming which contains obscene
material, indecent material[ 2 1] ... or material soliciting or promoting unlawful conduct. For purposes of this section, "material soliciting or promoting unlawful conduct" shall mean
material that is otherwise proscribed by law. A cable operator
may require any access user, or access manager or administrator
agreeing to assume the responsibility of certifying, to certify that
its programming does not contain any of the materials described above and that reasonable efforts will be used to ensure
that live programming does not contain such material.2 2
Several organizations interested in preserving access 23 appealed the FCC's leased and PEG access censorship regulations to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The
court of appeals stayed the enforcement of the regulations pending its decision.
The scheme adopted by the FCC would allow cable operators
to require and rely upon certifications by programmers that their
program is not indecent or obscene. The FCC found that nothing
in section 10 requires a cable operator to prescreen programming
on leased access channels. 24 The FCC "believe [s] that cable operators that do not prescreen, and thus do not have actual knowledge
1984 Cable Act § 638, 47 U.S.C. § 558 (1988).
In re Implementation of Section 10 of the Cable Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, First Report and Order, 8 F.C.C.R. 998 (1993) [hereinafter First
Report]; In re Implementation of Section 10 of the Cable Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992, Second Report and Order, 8 F.C.C.R. 2638 (1993) [hereinafter Second Report].
21 Indecent programming is defined as "programming that describes or depicts
sexual or excretory activities or organs in a patently offensive manner as measured by
contemporary community standards for the cable medium." 47 C.F.R. § 7 6 .7 01(g)
(1994).
22 47 C.F.R. § 76.702 (1994).
23 The Alliance for Community Media, the Alliance for Communications Democracy, People for the American Way, the Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc., and the American Civil Liberties Union.
24 First Report, 8 F.C.C.R. at 1005.
19

20
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of any obscene programming on leased access channels, are otherwise immune from prosecution for violation of obscenity laws. "25
The FCC indicated, however, that prescreening by cable operators
would be permissible to enforce policies adopted pursuant to section 10(a), which permits "a cable operator.

.

. [to] enforce pro-

spectively a written and published policy of prohibiting [on leased
access channels] programming [that the cable operator] reasonably believes, describes or depicts sexual or excretory activities or
organs in a patently offensive manner. "26 While this statement applies only to the provision of the 1992 Cable Act that permits cable
operators to prohibit certain types of programming on leased access channels, the FCC further indicated that "prescreening by
cable operators cannot be prohibited in light of the amendment
...that removes a cable operator's statutory immunity for obscene

programs on cable access channels." 27 This latter statement covers
PEG channels as well as leased access channels.28
The FCC provided that disputes with respect to PEG access
censorship "should be resolved in accordance with the rules and
procedures established by the franchising authority for the operation of these channels."' "To the extent that a franchise agreement does not provide for resolution of PEG channel disputes,"
the FCC added, "we assume that recourse could be obtained
through the local judicial process given the local nature and character of these channels."30 However, disputes regarding the FCC's
regulations, such as whether a program provider complied with the
FCC's program identification requirements, could be brought to
the FCC by cable operators.
The FCC's PEG regulations regarding censorship of indecent
speech on access channels and the portions of section 10 pursuant
to which they were adopted were found to be unconstitutional by a
panel of the D.C. Circuit.3 1 Subsequently, the full D.C. Circuit,
overturned the panel's decision on rehearing en banc.12 The earId. at 1005 n.39.
47 C.F.R. § 76.701(a) (1994).
First Report, 8 F.C.C.R. at 1005 n.39.
Second Report, 8 F.C.C.R. at 2642.
29 Id. at 2643.
30 Id.
31 Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 10 F.3d 812, 815 (D.C. Cir. 1993), vacated, 15 F.3d 186 (D.C. Cir. 1994). See also Altmann v. Television Signal Corp., 849 F.
Supp. 1335, 1341-43 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (granting preliminary injunction to producers
of public and leased access cable programs based on a claim that section 10 was
unconstitutional).
32 Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
25
26
27
28
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lier stays of the FCC's regulations remain in effect, however, pending action by the United States Supreme Court on petitions for
writs of certiorari."3
In holding the censorship scheme for PEG access to be unconstitutional, the panel found that it provided for censorship of constitutionally protected speech and that it constituted state action.
The panel found that "[t] here can be no doubt that the immediate
objective of the 1992 Act is to suppress indecent material" under a
highly-structured regulatory regime established by Congress and
the FCC. 4 It next found that the context of section 10 "evinces an
effort on the part of the government to enlist the cable operator in
the suppression of indecent material.""5 The panel recognized
that section 10, inter alia, (a) "removes cable operators' immunity
from liability for access programming insofar as it 'involves obscene material,'" (b) "focuses the cable operator's attention on the
only material the government seeks to suppress," (c) "facilitate[s]
the identification of [that] material" only, (d) denies cable operators the power to censor access programming "except for programming the government wishes to suppress," (e) provides for the
government to "step in to resolve certain disputes" over whether
material meets the government's standard; and (f) defines the extent to which material may be prohibited. 6
Finally, the panel found that section 10's ultimate effect would
be that cable operators, which-as Congress and the FCC repeatedly recognized-have every economic incentive to be hostile to
access programming, would "grasp the opportunity to ban certain
kinds of leased and [public] access programming if they are permitted to do so."3" Given this "significant encouragement," the
panel held that section 10's censorship scheme was "subject to the
same constitutional restrictions that constrain the government if it
were to enforce such a ban directly."'
On rehearing, the en banc court acknowledged that "[i]f decisions.., not to carry indecent programs... on access channels...
were treated as decisions of the government, the [FCC] and the
33 On July 10, 1995, the en banc court granted a motion to stay its mandate pending the filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari. Petitions for a writs of certiorari
were filed on July 18, 1995 in Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. and American Civil Liberties Union v. FCC, No. 95-124, and on August 9,
1995 in Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, No. 95-227.
34 Alliance for Community Media, 10 F.3d at 820.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 815, 819-21.
37 Id. at 822 (emphasis added).
38 Id.
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United States would be hard put to defend the constitutionality of
these provisions."3 9 The en banc court held, however, that because
the censorship contemplated by Congress was by its terms "permissive" - that is, cable operators may, but are not required to, censor
"indecent" programming on access channels - no state action was
involved in this scheme.
In addressing state action, the en banc court was unpersuaded
that state action was present even though "Congress enacted section 10(a) and section 10(c)," which on their face single out particular speech for unfavorable treatment based on its content, and "a
federal agency issued regulations putting the regulations into effect."40 The en banc court also rested its state action analysis on a
fundamental misapprehension of the nature of access channels the court incorrectly assumed that, prior to the 1984 Cable Act,
cable operators exercised editorial control over programming on
these channels. 41 As previously discussed, cable access channels
date back to the 1960s when local governments began requiring
them. 42 Prior to the 1984 Act, "[a]lmost all recent franchise agreements provide[d] for access by local governments, schools, and
non-profit and community groups" over PEG channels.43
The en banc court also ignored the preemptive effect of the
1992 Cable Act and the FCC's regulations in determining whether
state action is present. Sections 10(a) and 10(c) and the FCC's
implementing regulations displaced all contrary state laws and
franchising agreement provisions. Where a federal statute
preempts contrary state and local laws, the Supreme Court has
held that state action attaches regardless of the statute's otherwise
permissive nature.'
39

AUiancefor Community Media, 56 F.3d at 113.

40 Id. at 113.

Id. at 115.
See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1984), reprintedin 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4655, 4667).
44 See Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 231-32 (1956) (the Railway Labor Act's (RLA) "permissive" union shop provision implicated state action because it expressly declared that state law is superseded if union shop agreements were
entered into); Skinner v. RLEA, 489 U.S. 602, 615 (1989) (regulations pertaining to
non-mandatory drug-testing, which, inter alia, "pre-empt state laws, rules or regulations covering the same subject matter ... and are intended to supersede 'any provision of a collective bargaining agreement,'" constitute state action); see also
Communications Workers of America v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 761 (1988) ("[W]e ruled
in [Hanson] that because the RIA pre-empts all state laws banning union-security
agreements, the negotiation and enforcement of such provisions in railroad industry
contracts involves 'governmental action' and is therefore subject to constitutional limitations."); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 218 n.12 (1977) (the RLA
41
42
43
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In addition, disregarding the petitioners' argument that section 10 was not passive and that Skinner v. RLEA was applicable, the
en banc court held that no significant encouragement was present
to implicate state action. 45 The en banc court reached this conclusion despite the petitioners' contention that section 10(d)'s imposition of liability and administrative burdens on cable operators for
the speech of others means that cable operators will use their censorship powers broadly.
The en banc court also considered and rejected the contention
that, as Congress, commentators, and the FCC have recognized,
access channels constitute a public forum.4 6 Notwithstanding the
47
Supreme Court's recognition in Turner BroadcastingSystem v. FCC
that the cable "infrastructure entails use of public rights-of-way and
easements," the en banc court focused solely on ownership of the
equipment by which programming is transmitted into homes and
held that access channels "belong to private cable operators" and
therefore could never be a public forum.4 8
Finally, the en banc court considered whether section 10(b)'s
mandatory blocking of "indecency" on leased access, as a contentbased restriction on speech, was the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling state interest, which it characterized as protecting children from indecency.4 9 As the en banc court itself
acknowledged, existing law already mandates that cable operators
make lockboxes available to subscribers, that lockboxes enable parents "to block indecent programming they do not want their children to see," and that lockboxes "are effective means of restricting
access to indecent programming. "50 Notwithstanding that
lockboxes provide less restrictive means than section 10(b) to further the government's articulated interest, the en banc court nonetheless upheld the constitutionality of section 10(b). 5
Fourjudges dissented from all or part of the majority opinion.
In the principal dissenting opinion, Judge Wald concluded that
"pre-empts any attempt by a State to prohibit a union-shop agreement. Had it not
been for that federal statute, the union-shop provision at issue in Hanson would have
been invalidated under Nebraska law. The Hanson Court accordingly reasoned that
government action was present ....").
45 Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105, 119-21 D.C. Cir. 1995).
46 Id. at 121-23.
47 114 S.Ct. 2445, 2452 (1994), reh'g denied, 115 S.Ct. 30 (1994).
48 Alliance for Community Media, 56 F.3d at 122.
49 Id. at 123-28. See Sable Communications of Calif., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126
(1989).
50 AUiancefor Community Media, 56 F.3d at 127 n.22.
51 Id. at 126.
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sections 10(a), 10(b), and 10(c) involved state action and were unconstitutional.5 2 Judges Wald and Tatel recognized that "cable operators and programmers are subject to two fundamentally
different statutorily-assigned schemes of substantive and procedural rights, duties, and burdens with respect to [access] programming. Which of these schemes applies depends solely on whether
the content of the programming meets the government's definition of 'indecent."' 5 3 This differential treatment demonstrates that
"the government disfavors 'indecent' speech, and seeks through
this differential regulation to limit speech in that disfavored category. " " Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Turner, Judges
Wald and Tatel concluded that section 10 constitutes "a congressionally enacted statute that both facially discriminates on the basis of
the content of speech, and has a 'manifest purpose' to 'burden...
55
speech of a particular content."
C. Pending and Future Legislation
1.

104th Congress

Legislation pending in the 104th Congress will comprehensively rewrite existing telecommunications law. On August 4, 1995,
the U.S. House of Representatives, by a vote of 305-117, passed
H.R. 1555 which would largely deregulate the telecommunications
industries. The U.S. Senate had previously passed a similar bill S. 652 - on June 15, 1995 by a vote of 81-18. The two bills are
being considered in conference between the two chambers, with
final action not expected before late September at the earliest. In
addition to the uncertainty arising from differences between the
two bills is the possibility of a Presidential veto.
Both the House and Senate bills would eliminate most restrictions on cross-ownership, substantially relax limitations on media
concentration and allow telephone and cable companies to enter
each other's businesses.
a.

HR. 1555

Although H.R. 1555 would allow telephone companies to pro52 Chief Judge Edwards and Judge Rogers agreed that sections 10(a) and 10(b)
together constitute state action, but found no state action with respect to section
10(c). Only Judge Wald and Judge Tatel found state action present with respect to
section 10(c).
53 Id. at 143.
54 Id. at 144.
5 Id. at 144 (quoting Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2461
(1994), reh'g denied, 115 S. Ct. 30 (1994)).
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vide video programming service in their telephone service areas
without obtaining a local franchise, it provides, in a new section of
the Communications Act of 1934, for the FCC to prescribe regulations to ensure that telephone companies met PEG obligations
equivalent to those contained in cable franchises.5 6 Those obligations cover "capacity, services, facilities, and equipment." In discussing the identicil provisions contained in a bill in the 103d
Congress, Second Session (H.R. 3636), the Report of the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce on H.R. 3626 explained:
The Committee believes it is critical that advanced telecommunications systems include both the ability to receive and the
ability to create and provide information. PEG access has provided groups and individuals who generally have not had access
sources
to the electronic media with the opportunity to become
57
of information in the electronic marketplace of ideas.
b.

S. 652

S. 652 provides for PEG access in a more limited way than does
H.R. 1555. Section 202 of S. 652 requires common carriers providing video platform services to provide access to local broadcast stations and to those PEG entities "required by local franchise
authorities to be given access to cable systems operating in the
same market as the common carrier video platform."58 Such access
must be carried at rates no higher than the "incremental-cost-based
rates of providing access." The Senate Committee Report accompanying S. 652 explains that "[t]hese provisions recognize that local broadcast stations and local public, educational and
governmental (PEG) entities provide unique services to the local
community."5 9 However, unlike section 656 of the Communications Act of 1934 that would be added by H.R. 1555, the capacity is
not provided without cost and there is no requirement that the
common carrier provide "services, facilities and equipment."
2.

103d Congress -

Is the Past a Prologue for the Future?

In contrast to the relatively limited provisions in the legislation
now pending in the 104th Congress was the inclusion of a provision in the bill reported out of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation in the 103d Congress, Second
56
57
58
59

141 CONG. REc. H8438 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995).
H.R. REP. No. 560, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 84 (1994).
141 CoNG. REC. S8578 (daily ed. June 16, 1995).
S. REP. No. 23, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., at 38 (1995).
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Session (S. 1822) that would have provided for public space for
certain types of defined "eligible entities." Section 103 of that bill
would have added a new section 201B to the Communications Act
of 1934:
SEC. 201B PUBLIC RIGHTS-OF-WAY.
(a) REQUIREMENT FOR RESERVED CAPACITY.-...
[The Federal Communications] Commission shall promulgate
regulations to require owners and operators of telecommunications networks to reserve, for public uses, up to 5 percent of the
capacity on such networks used for the delivery of information
services, for use by eligible entities at incremental cost based
rates for the delivery of information services to the general public. The capacity shall be reserved in exchange for the use of
public rights-of-way accorded telecommunications networks.
The capacity shall be allocated pursuant to regulations promulgated by the Commission and State authorities. The owner or
operator of any affected telecommunications network shall have
no control over, and no liability for, the communications content of such capacity.
(c)

ALLOCATION OF CAPACITY.(1) ELIGIBLE ENTITIES.-The following entities
are eligible for access to the capacity reserved under this
section:
(A) elementary and secondary schools... and institutions of higher education ....
(B) Public telecommunications entities.
(C) Public and nonprofit libraries.
(D) Nonprofit organizations described in section
501(c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 that
are formed for the purpose of providing nondiscriminatory public access to noncommercial educational, informational, cultural, civic, or charitable services.
(3) ALLOCATION.-The Commission and the States
shall determine appropriate mechanisms and guidelines for
allocating such capacity.
(d) DEFINITIONS.-As used in this section(1) The term "telecommunications network" means
any group of facilities that has been granted the right to
occupy any public right-of-way and that is used to transmit
or carry information services, including video services, to
the general public, and that provides the consumer or enduser the opportunity to choose from a range of information
services that are available contemporaneously to the gen-
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eral public. Neither terrestrial radio or television broadcast
stations licensed under title III, nor cable systems subject to
sections 611 and 615, shall be considered to be telecommunications networks.
(2) The term "public right-of-way" means any right-ofway, including use of the electromagnetic spectrum, that is
held or otherwise controlled by Federal, State, or local governments on behalf of the general public, and is used
in the
60
transmission or carriage of telecommunications.
Section 103, as it emerged from Committee markup, had as its
origin a far more visionary bill-S. 2195, the National Public Telecommunications Infrastructure Act of 1994, that had been introduced by Senator Inouye of Hawaii. That bill would have required
the reservation of up to twenty percent of the capacity, rather than up
to five percent, at no charge, rather than incremental cost, to eligible entities that included (in addition to those set forth in section
103 of S. 1822) state, local, and tribalgovernments and their agencies. S.
2195 also provided for a Public Telecommunications Infrastructure
Fund to provide sufficient economic support to eligible entities to
use the reserved capacity for the purposes set forth in the bill. The
fund would have been financed by contributions from owners and
operators of telecommunication networks, from a designated portion of any universal service fund that may be established, and from
such other sources as may be established by the FCC.
3.

The 1994 Senate Committee Report on S. 1822

The language in the Report of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on S. 1822 is a paean to PEG
access and the values it serves. In laying the groundwork for section 103, the report stated:
[T]he U.S. Government has a compelling interest in ensuring
that all citizens of the United States have access to a broad and
diverse array of communications services, including noncommercial educational, informational, cultural, civic, and charitable services. Such broad access furthers the Government's
compelling interests in education, in facilitating widespread
public discourse among all citizens, and in improving democratic self-governance. Because citizens now receive a large majority of their information through use of these
telecommunications networks, the owners of these networks will
become gatekeepers of the information that the public receives.

60

S. REp. No. 367, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 125-27 (1994).
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[T]he owners of these telecommunications networks
are likely to design their networks so as to maximize the potential profit of such networks.... [E]ntities providing noncommercial educational, informational, cultural, civic, and
charitable services are likely to be excluded because such entities are ordinarily unable to afford the connection charges, the
transmission costs, and the special equipment needed to access
telecommunications networks that commercial programmers
and users are able to afford. Thus, these entities are likely to
face daunting economic barriers in trying to access the new
technologies now becoming available.
By reserving capacity for public users, the legislation provides a public forum for speech without involving the Government in regulating speech content. The reservation of capacity
for these public uses is thus the least restrictive means of promoting the legitimate governmental need to promote diversity
of speech over these communications media.
Congress has previously recognized the value of such public
fora in enacting the 1984 Cable Act. The House Energy and
Commerce Committee, in its discussions leading to the 1984
Cable Act, described the public, educational, and governmental
channels as an open forum for all groups, no matter what their
viewpoint. 61
In describing the role PEG access has played, the report
observed:
Existing telecommunication technologies have already permitted the development of diverse community-based programming that has increased civic discourse and expanded access
and services to informational, cultural, educational, and healthrelated services. For instance, community use of public, educational, and governmental (PEG) access channels on cable systems has become a vital means of maintaining an informed and
involved citizenry. Community use of PEG access channels has
increased dramatically over the past 20 years. Over 20,000 hours
of new programs are now produced each week, totaling over 1
million hours of new programs per year. This is greater than
ABC, CBS, NBC, and PBS combined.62
The public space provisions considered by the Senate in 1994,
which are not contained in the bills passed by either the Senate or
House in 1995, deserve consideration in future sessions of Congress as a prototype for universal service on the advanced telecom61 Id. at 13-14.
62 Id. at 15.
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munications systems that will be developed., The current
legislation recognizes the need to address universal service, but defers consideration by providing for the establishment of a FederalState Joint Board to develop recommendations to the FCC (and,
under the House bill, to State commissions). 63
4.

Post Script: Censorship Redux

Censorship is again a focus in the current Congress. There
are a number of provisions in Title IV of S. 652, entitled the "Communications Decency Act of 1995," which threaten free speech.'
Section 409 of Title IV directly targets PEG and leased channels,
giving cable operators the authority to refuse to transmit any public access or leased access program which contains obscenity, indecency, or nudity. Specifically, that section would amend the PEG
access provision of section 611 (e) of the 1984 Cable Act (47 U.S.C.
§ 531 (e)) to provide as follows, with the added language
emphasized:
Subject to section 624(d), a cable operator shall not exercise any editorial control over any public, educational, or governmental use of channel capacity provided pursuant to this
section, except a cable operatormay refuse to transmit any public access
program or portion of65a public access program which contains obscenity,
indecency, or nudity.
A similar provision would amend section 612(c) (2) of the 1984
Cable Act (47 U.S.C. § 532(c) (2)) to provide as follows, with the
added language emphasized:
A cable operator shall not exercise any editorial control
over any video programming provided pursuant to this section,
or in any other way consider the content of such programming,
except that a cable operator may refuse to transmit any leased access
program or portion of a leased access program which contains obscenity,
indecency, or nudity ... [and] may consider such content to the
minimum extent necessary to establish a reasonable price for
the commercial use of designated channel capacity by an unaffiliated person.86
By including "nudity" and by not establishing any procedural
mechanism, such as the FCC rulemaking process contained in the
63 S. 652, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 103, 141 CONG. REc. S8574-75 (daily ed.June 16,
1995); H.R. 1555, 104th Cong. 1st Sess. § 101, 141 CONG. REc. H8429-30 (daily ed.
Aug. 4, 1995).
64 141 CONG. REc. S8588-90 (daily ed. June 16, 1995).
65 141 CONG. Rc. S8589 (daily ed. June 16, 1995).
66 Id. at S8590.
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1992 Cable Act, these changes would sweep far more broadly than
the censorship provisions in the 1992 Cable Act (section 10) that
are being challenged in Alliance for Community Media v. FCC.6 7
Although H.R. 1555, the comprehensive House telecommunications bill, does not contain similar censorship provisions targeting PEG access," a separate bill (H.R. 1540), the "Family Viewing
Cable Television Act of 1995" introduced by Representatives Tony
Hall (D-Ohio) and Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ) would amend the
U.S. Criminal Code to provide:
(a) Whoever knowingly disseminates any indecent material on
any channel provided to all subscribers as part of a basic cable
television package shall be imprisoned not more than two years
or fined under this title, or both.
(b) As used in this section, the term "basic cable television
package" means those channels provided by any means for a basic cable subscription fee to all cable subscribers, including "basic cable service" and "other programming service" as those
terms are defined in section 602 of the Communications Act of
1934 (47 U.S.C. 522), but does not include separate channels
that are provided to subscribers upon specific request, whether
or not a separate or additional fee is charged.
This bill goes beyond PEG access, and would also affect broadcast
television and some cable satellite channels.
Other censorship provisions in Title IV of S. 652 are intended
to protect minors from sexually explicit material but would infringe First Amendment rights. Section 402 would expand the existing prohibitions against obscene, lewd, indecent or harassing
uses of a telephone to all telecommunications facilities, such as the
Internet.69 Sections 403 and 404 would increase the fine for transmitting obscene programming on cable and radio broadcasting
from $10,000 to $100,000.70 Section 407 would require cable operators to fully scramble or otherwise block objectionable programming upon subscriber request and at no charge to the subscriber. 7 '
The Clinton Administration has raised problems with the censorship provisions in S. 652 and has called for a comprehensive review
67

For a discussion of Alliance, see supra notes 31-55 and accompanying text.

H.R. 1555 does contain provisions for establishing a television rating code to
identify and rate "video programming that contains sexual, violent or other indecent
material about which parents should be informed before it is displayed to children."
69 141 CONG. REC. S8588-89 (daily ed. June 16, 1995).
70 Id. at S8589.
71 Id.
68
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of the issues, including Congressional hearings.7 2
The House bill contains comparable provisions regarding
transmission of indecent or obscene material. Section 403 of
H.R. 1555 would make it a federal crime to transmit "indecent"
material to minors over the Internet, and clarifies that federal laws
prohibiting distribution of "obscene" material also apply to computers.7" Section 104 of the bill also creates a "Good Samaritan"
defense for on-line service providers and users of the Internet."4
Under this section, no provider or user can be held liable for information provided by a content provider. However, no provider or
user will be held liable for any action to restrict material which is
obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or
otherwise objectionable.
Both the Senate and House bills also contain provisions requiring violence chips, or "v-chips," in television sets.7 5 These
chips are designed to block programs which have been electronically labelled as violent, sexually explicit, or otherwise unsuitable
for children. S. 652 requires that broadcasters come up with their
own rules for rating television programs, or that a Presidentially
appointed commission set rules if the broadcasters fail to do so.
H.R. 1555, by contrast, does not require broadcasters to submit ratings for their programs.

72 A paper titled "Administration Concerns Regarding S. 652: The Telecommunications Competition and Deregulation Act of 1995" states:
The Administration shares the Committee's goal of preventing obscenity from being widely transmitted over networks. However, the legislation raises complex policy issues that merit close examination prior to
Congressional action. These include the impact of additional regulation on the development of the National Information Infrastructure,
the ability of industry to develop technological solutions to the
problems the legislation is intended to address, the effect on First
Amendment and privacy considerations, and the increasingly global nature of the infrastructure. The piecemeal approach taken in this legislation is inadvisable. Instead, a comprehensive review should be
undertaken, including Congressional hearings.
Id. at 9.
73 141 CONG. REc. H8450-51 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995).
74 Id. at H8469.
75 141 CONG. REc. S8590 (daily ed. June 16, 1995), 141 CONG. REc. H8503 (daily
ed. Aug. 4, 1995).
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AccEss PROVISIONS OF FEDERAL CABLE ACTS

SHOULD WITHSTAND FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS

A.

Turner BroadcastingSystem, Inc. v. FCC

In Turner BroadcastingSystem, Inc. v. FCC,7 6 the Supreme Court
considered First Amendment challenges to sections 4 and 5 of the
1992 Cable Act (the "must-carry" provisions applicable to carriage
of local broadcast stations on cable systems). By a slim and unstable majority, the Court established that regulations such as the
must-carry provisions would be analyzed under an intermediate
standard, easier to satisfy than the strict standard for which the
cable operators argued. It is unclear whether the provisions of the
1984 Cable Act that permit franchising authorities to condition the
grant of franchises on a promise of PEG access will be analyzed
under the same intermediate standard. Furthermore, the exact parameters of the factual showing which the government must make
to satisfy this intermediate standard has not yet been established.
In Turner, the Court held that it did not have enough information
at its disposal to decide the case, and remanded to the district
court for further fact-finding. Even though the Court refused to
decide whether the must-carry provisions as currently written are
constitutional, the dissent-which considered the provisions as
drafted to be unconstitutional-offered hints as to how Congress
might redraft them within the bounds of the Constitution. This
discussion by the dissent suggests that PEG access requirements
may be constitutional.
The fundamental issue in the case was what type of scrutiny to
apply in analyzing the "must-carry" provisions-the relatively lax
scrutiny applied to regulation of the broadcast media, the strict
scrutiny applied to content-based regulation of print media and
other forms of speech, or something in between. The Court dismissed the federal government's argument that regulation of cable
operators should be analyzed under the same standard as regulation of the broadcast medium. The Court reaffirmed that the physical limitations of the broadcast medium require that those who
would use the medium subject themselves to more extensive governmental regulation than would otherwise be appropriate and
constitutional.7 7 As the Court stated, "[t] he broadcast cases are inapposite in the present context because cable television does not
suffer from the inherent limitations that characterize the broadcast
76 114 S. Ct. 2445, reh'g denied, 115 S. Ct. 30 (1994).
77 Id. at 2457.
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medium."7 8
The majority and dissent disagreed, however, about how strict
the scrutiny of cable regulation should be. The debate turned primarily upon the Justices' categorization of the must-carry provisions as content-neutral or content-based regulations of speech.
The majority decided that the must-carry provisions are contentneutral regulations, appropriately subjected to an intermediate
level of scrutiny. "Insofar as they pertain to the carriage of full
power broadcasters," the Court held, "the must-carry rules ... impose burdens and confer benefits without reference to the content
of speech."7 9 The Court noted that the provisions impose obligations upon all cable operators based solely on the number of subscribers and channel capacity of the system, "regardless of the
programs or stations they now offer or have offered in the past."8"
Similarly, the Court pointed out that provisions uniformly burden
all cable programmers by reducing the number of channels for
which they can compete, "[b] ut, again, this burden is unrelated to
content, for it extends to all cable programmers irrespective of the
programming they choose to offer viewers."" Furthermore, the
Court noted, the provisions distinguish between speakers in the television programming market-favoring the broadcast medium
over cable programmers and operators-"based only upon the
manner in which speakers transmit
their messages . . . and not
82
upon the messages they carry."
The dissent took issue most strenuously with this last assertion,
that Congress's attempt to discriminate between broadcast and
cable media is content-neutral. The dissent disputed the majority's
assertion that Congress's motivation for enacting the must-carry
provisions was simply to protect the continued availability of "free"
(broadcast) television, without regard to the content of the programming. Instead, Justice O'Connor asserted in dissent, Congress's intent was to promote diversity and localism in television
programming. In support, the dissent quoted the 1992 Cable Act,
in which Congress wrote:
"There is a substantial governmental and First Amendment interest in promoting a diversity of views .... [P]ublic television
provides educational and informational programming to the
Nation's citizens, thereby advancing the Government's compel78
79

Id.
Id. at 2460 (footnote omitted).

80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
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ling interest in educating its citizens. A primary objective and
benefit of our Nation's system of regulation of television broadcasting is the local origination of programming ....

Broadcast

television stations continue to be an important source of local
news and public affairs programming and other
local broadcast
83
services critical to an informed electorate."
Moreover, Justice O'Connor referred to various provisions of the
1992 Act-including the must-carry provisions as applied to low
power broadcast stations-which direct the FCC to "afford particular attention to the value of localism" in making its decisions.8 4
The linch-pin in the dissent's argument against the must-carry provisions is the assertion that "[p] references for diversity of viewpoints, for localism, for educational programming, and for news
and public affairs all make reference to content."85
The four dissenting Justices considered a preference for diversity and localism in programming to be a content-based distinction
giving rise to strict scrutiny of cable television regulation. This may
represent a significant obstacle for PEG access. First, Justice Blackmun, joining the majority in Turner, has left the Court; whether
Justice Breyer will consider the protection of diversity and localism
in television programming to be an impermissibly content-based
speech restriction is unknown. Perhaps more ominously, it is not
even clear that members of the Turner majority would come to the
defense of a regulation motivated explicitly and exclusively by the
desire to promote diversity and localism in programming. The
Turner majority responded to the dissent's attack by contradicting
the dissent's interpretation of the facts of the case, not the interpretation of the law. The Turner majority insisted that Congress's
intent in enacting the must-carry provisions was to "'protect[ ]
noncable households from loss of regular television broadcasting
service due to competition from cable systems.' ' 8 6 The majority
specifically disavowed that "Congress' purpose in enacting mustcarry was to force programming of a 'local' or 'educational' content on cable subscribers." 7 Consequently, one may doubt the viability of some speech restrictions, the sole justification for which

Id. at 2476 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quotations omitted).
1992 Cable Act, sec. 4, § 614(h) (1) (C) (ii), 106 Stat. 1460, 1476 (1992) (codified
as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 534(h)(1)(C)(ii) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
85 Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2477 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
86 Id. at 2461 (quoting Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 714
83

84

(1984)).
87 Id. at 2462.
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rests upon the special value of diverse, local, or educational
programming.
Whether the government's interest in promoting diversity can
survive the scrutiny to which it will be subjected is diminished by
the Supreme Court's 5-4 decisions last term in Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena8 and Miller v. Johnso'n8 9 . Those decisions held, respectively, that racial classifications in federal contracting and drawing
of congressional districts were not sufficiently narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling governmental interest to survive the strict scrutiny the Court's majorities found appropriate. The decision in
Adarand reversed the holding in Metro Broadcasting,Inc. v. FCC that
"benign" federal racial classifications (in that case involving minority ownership of broadcast stations) need only satisfy intermediate
scrutiny and "are constitutionally permissible to the extent that
they serve important governmental objectives within the power of
Congress and are substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives. "9°
Nevertheless, the constitutional outlook for PEG access requirements may be brighter than that for the must-carry provisions.
Language in the dissenting opinion in Turner suggests that it was
not so much Congress's penchant for localism in programming
that provoked the dissent's ire, but rather Congress's willingness to
single out a group of speakers-broadcasters-to favor at the expense of another group-cable operators. The dissent conceded
that the government's interest in promoting localism and diversity
is legitimate, even important.9 1 But, the dissent argued, that interest is not compelling enough to justify content-based discrimination between groups of speakers.9 2 By negative inference, then,
one may conclude that the government's interest in promoting localism and diversity is sufficiently strong to justify content-neutral
regulations that do not discriminate among speakers. In other
words, the government's interest in supporting diverse, local programming may justify public access requirements, particularly if
such access is free from government censorship.9 " Justice
88 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
89 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).

90 497 U.S. 547, 565 (1990). See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2112, 2115.
91 See Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2478 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
92 See id. at 2479 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
93 Governmental and educational access requirements still suffer the same constitutional infirmity as the must-carry provisions-that the provisions privilege certain
speakers over cable operators-but the justification for them is different and perhaps
more compelling. Government's interest in educating the public and maintaining a
civically active electorate may be sufficiently compelling to survive strict scrutiny.
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O'Connor conceded as much when she declared that "Congress
might ... conceivably obligate cable operators to act as common
carriers for some of their channels, with those channels being
open to all through some sort of lottery system or timesharing arrangement."9 4 "[S]uch an approach," the dissent concluded,
"would not suffer from the defect of preferring one speaker
to
another."9 5
B.

Daniels Cablevision, Inc. v. United States

The constitutionality of the PEG and leased access provisions
of the 1984 and 1992 Cable Acts were upheld upon direct challenge in Daniels Cablevision, Inc. v. United States.9 6 Somewhat ominously, however, the en banc majority in Alliance for Community
Media v. FCCobserved " [w] e express no view on whether the provisions of the 1984 and 1982 Acts requiring cable operators to set
aside leased access channels and permitting franchising authorities
to force operators to set aside PEG access channels infringe upon the
97
First Amendment rights of cable operators or programmers."
Plaintiffs in Daniels argued that the access provisions forced cable
operators to engage in "speech" they might not otherwise undertake and that, by using up channel capacity, those provisions favored the speech of PEG and leased access programmers over that
of cable operators and others. In upholding those provisions,
Judge Jackson stated:
The PEG and leased access provisions were enacted to serve
a significant regulatory interest, viz., affording speakers with
lesser market appeal access to the nation's most pervasive video
distribution technology.... Enabling a broad range of speakers
to reach a television audience that otherwise would never hear
them is an appropriate goal and a legitimate exercise of federal
legislative power....
The leased access provisions are likewise content-neutral,
and they are designed to serve a similar market regulatory function. The provisions promote fair competition by overcoming
the natural tendency of cable operators to enhance the profitability of their affiliated programmers....
Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2480 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id.
835 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1993), petitionfor review filed, No. 93-5290 (D.C. Cir.).
The district judge in that case, Hon. Thomas Penfield Jackson, is a member of the
three-judge district court panel that decided Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC,
819 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C. 1993), the case that was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court
on appeal in Turner, and which is considering the case further on remand.
97 Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105, 144 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
94
95
96
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Nor do the PEG and leased access provisions overreach.
PEG use is negotiable, and leased access obligations are directly
proportional to the number of channels a cable operator has
available, never exceeding 15 percent of total capacity. Operators retain discretion over the remainder, and may, of course,
utilize them as they wish, for
their own programming or for that
98
of affiliated programmers.
Judge Jackson articulated the appropriate level of scrutiny for such
provisions:
[T]he crucial inquiry for determining the appropriate level of
First Amendment scrutiny is not merely whether governmental
regulation results in compelling certain speech, fetters the
speaker's discretion in deciding what to say, or favors particular
speakers at the expense of others, but is also whether the regulation is, overtly or covertly, content-based; that is, the government is telling the speaker what can or cannot be said.
Constraints on speech, even if deriving from an exercise of governmental authority, need be strictly scrutinized only if the government has specified the speaker's message.... Although the

provisions at issue here may impose some limit on the autonomy
of cable operators to speak only such speech as they would
themselves pronounce, most do so only to serve regulatory goals
unrelated to content. Accordingly, these other provisions, too,
are constitutional, as was the case with Must-Carry, if those goals
serve significant governmental interests and do not burden substantially more speech than necessary to serve these interests. 9 9
Judge Jackson did find several provisions of the 1992 Cable
Act to be unconstitutional, including the section that required
cable operators to give subscribers at least thirty days advance notice before providing a free preview of a premium channel offering
X, NC-17, or R-rated movies. 10 He agreed with the claim that such
a provision is content-related, burdens protected speech, and fails
to survive the strict scrutiny to which such legislation must be subjected. He found that the section was overbroad because it delegated the determination of indecency to a trade association, the
Motion Picture Association.
Judge Jackson upheld section 10(d) of the 1992 Cable Act,
which removed the statutory immunity for carriage of obscene material on access channels. He recognized that "cable operators may
not exercise any editorial control over the PEG or leased access
Daniels Cablevision, 835 F. Supp. at 6-7 (citations omitted).
99 Id. at 4-5 (citations and footnote omitted).
100 Id. at 9-10.
98
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channels they are required to carry," and he acknowledged the argument, made by the American Civil Liberties Union, that the potential for liability impermissibly burdens speech by creating an
unacceptable incentive for operator self-censorship. 01 Nonetheless, he concluded:
The danger of self-censorship induced by the ambiguity inherent in the concept of obscenity itself has never been held to
mandate a constitutional requirement for general immunity
from obscenity laws for anyone. In other words, no speakerscable operators included-have a constitutional right to immunity to relieve them of anxiety about crossing the threshold from
the risqu6 to the obscene. Congress' earlier decision to provide
cable operators with immunity was a matter of grace that it has
10 2
always been free to rescind.
The ultimate significance of this latter finding may depend on
whether the U.S. Supreme Court reviews the en banc decision of the
D.C. Circuit in Alliancefor Community Media v. FCC.10 3 In any event,
cable operators should have common law immunity, even if statutory immunity is removed, for programming over which they are
precluded from exercising editorial control.
IV.

AccEss MANAGEMENT AND FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUES

There are several ways to manage access: e.g., through nonprofit access management organizations, local governments, educational institutions, libraries, cable operators, or combinations of
the foregoing. Which particular structure to adopt is a choice that
is determined locally.
The majority of cable franchises that provide for any PEG access provide for all three kinds-public, educational, and governmental-although it is not uncommon for only one or two of these
kinds of access to be provided.1" 4 If a single channel is available for
PEG access, then a single entity manages the channel, including
equipment and facilities needed to deliver access services. If more
than one channel is available, and particular forms of access are
provided on separate channels, then more than one entity might
manage an individual channel or group of channels. It is not un101 Id. at 10-11.
102
103
104

Id. at 11.

See supra notes 31-55 and accompanying text (discussing Alliance).
But see infra notes 130-37 and accompanying text (discussing whether governmental and educational access are constitutionally permissible if there is no public
access).
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common, however, particularly in small and medium sized cities,
for a single entity to manage more than one form of access.
A.

Pros and Cons of the ParticularStructures

There are advantages and disadvantages to each of the structures, in terms of accountability, costs, fundraising potential, and
legal exposure. A threshold consideration is whether the economies available through management by a single entity are of sufficient significance to overcome the advantages of separate
management of the different forms of access.
The most significant consideration in choosing a form of management is the issue of legal exposure for programming decisions
made in connection with public access channels. The 1984 Cable
Act states that "cable operators shall not incur any such liability for
any program carried on any channel designated for public, educational, [or] governmental use."1 ° - As noted previously, the 1992
Cable Act removed the statutory exemption for programming on
access channels that "involves obscene material." 10 6 However,
cable operators retain their common law immunity from liability
for the content of programming on access channels that they
merely carry for others in the absence of knowledge that it is obscene. The FCC has ruled that operators who do not have any "actual knowledge" that the programming on access channels is
obscene would "otherwise [be] immune from prosecution for violations of obscenity laws."107
Similarly, local governments are immune from monetary liability for the content of programming by others on public access.
Section 635A, 47 U.S.C. § 555a, added by the 1992 Cable Act,
provides:
(a) SUITS FOR DAMAGES PROHIBITED.-In any court
proceeding... involving any claim against a franchising authority or other governmental entity, or any official, member, employee, or agent of such authority or entity, arising from the
regulation of cable service or from a decision of approval or disapproval with respect to a grant, renewal, transfer, or amendment of a franchise, any relief, to the extent such relief is
required by any other provision of Federal, State, or local law,
1984 Cable Act § 638, 47 U.S.C. § 558 (1988).
See supra notes 101-103 and accompanying text.
107 Implementation of Section 10 of the Cable Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, First Report and Order, 8 F.C.C.R. 998, 1005 n.39 (1993).
105

106
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shall be limited to injunctive relief and declaratory relief.10
This exemption from damages probably does not extend to actions
taken in managing an access channel because such management
may not be construed as "arising from the regulation of cable service." Nonetheless, a local government should not be liable under
common law for the content of programming that appears on a
public forum. This rationale should also be applicable to the types
of entities that manage public access as a public forum.1 °"
The legal danger for local governments that manage public
access is the potential liability for violating a programmer's or
viewer's First Amendment rights if constitutionally protected
speech is kept off a public access channel. Other kinds of entities
that manage access share this potential exposure, but the exposure
of local governments is greatest because it represents the clearest
case of state action.
A 1994 decision by a state district court in Colorado found that
the City and County of Denver and a non-profit corporation that
managed public access were liable for violating a programmer's
free speech and due process rights under state and federal law.
The court also found that the access corporation was liable for violating section 611(e) of the 1984 Cable Act, 47 U.S.C. § 531(e),
and that the access corporation was liable for breach of contract in
refusing to air a program which it wrongfully deemed to be obscene.' 10 The court found that "the purpose of public access is to
provide an avenue for public expression and is therefore a public
forum." The court went on to state:
It is possible for interests, otherwise private, to bear a close
relationship with the government, and become affected with a
public interest. A private project may operate in such a manner
that it performs a public function .... This Court finds that
DCTV [the non-profit corporation managing public access] is
performing a public function.... In its franchising agreement
with Mile Hi, Denver chose to establish public access channel
capacity. In Ordinance 55, Denver further chose to have that
channel managed by a private entity. The fact that management
authority has been delegated does not diminish the public function DCTV performs.
Additionally, Denver participates in management of the
108 1992 Cable Act, sec. 24, § 635A, 106 Stat. 1460, 1500 (codified as amended at 47

U.S.C. 555a (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).

109 But see Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105, 121-23 (D.C. Cir.

1995).
110 Palange v. Denver Community TV, No. 92-CV-4429 (D. Colo., Aug. 31, 1994).
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public access channel. Procedures for management are approved and copyrighted by Denver and state explicitly that
"DCTV is a Public Access Project of the City and County of Denver." All proposed policy or procedure changes must be approved by the City. The Management Agreement requires
Denver to approve DCTV's annual budget and conduct on-site
monitoring. Such involvement is far from a mere incident of
the state's regulatory supervision, as defendants argue."'
Two lessons are clear from Palange:. (1) there is a significant
risk to access management entities in censoring programming;
and, (2) a local government's exposure to liability is a function of
the level of its involvement in management, even if a separate entity is selected to manage public access.
V.

MUST PUBLIC ACCESS BE PROVIDED ON CABLE?

In Missouri Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kansas City,112 the
court decided that access requirements cannot be constitutionally
eliminated if the purpose is to suppress speech. The plaintiffs'
complaint in that case raised the question, which the court did not
address, whether access channel capacity is constitutionally required. Other open questions include whether public access is required where governmental and/or educational access is provided,
and whether franchising authorities are required to ensure adequate funding for access.
A.

The General Issue Raised but not Decided in Kansas City

In the second count of the complaint in Kansas City, the plaintiffs claimed the city's decision to eliminate the public access channel was unlawful, regardless of the city's motive, because Kansas
City was constitutionally obliged to set aside at least one access
channel. The plaintiffs argued that the city could not grant to the
cable operator what amounted to a monopoly right to speak, absent some constitutionally adequate justification.
As to that count, the court did not rule, for lack of a sufficiently developed record. The court held that because "Count II is
a claim of first impression," 1 3 the viability of that count must be
evaluated against a completely developed record.' 1 4 Because the
case was settled before trial, the record against which the viability
11
112
113
114

Id., slip. op. at 3.
723 F. Supp. 1347 (W.D. Mo. 1989).

Id. at 1350.
Id. at 1353.
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of Count II must be measured was never developed, and the issue
will be one of first impression in a future case. Resolution of the
issue, whether access must be required under all circumstances,
will likely depend on whether access channels are considered to be
a public forum and, if so, whether they represent a traditional public forum or a designated forum. The Kansas City court, addressing
the first count, on which the case was decided, "assume [d] for the
sake of argument" that the access channel was a designated public
forum and observed that "there is no obligation to indefinitely
maintain a designated public forum."" 5 If access channels were
found to be a traditional public forum, however, there would be a
powerful argument that government has an obligation to maintain
them indefinitely.
Borrowing liberally, and extensively, from the plaintiffs' brief
in Kansas City, the legal arguments in favor of mandatory access
follow:
Allowing a monopoly cable operator alone to decide what information enters the family home on cable poses a chilling prospect for the First Amendment rights of every resident in a city.
This predicament "makes it clear that both public and leased access channels must always be available for use by the public to
avoid abridging the First Amendment rights of American citizens."1 16 A public access channel represents more than may meet
the untrained eye. A public access channel "secure[s] the foundation upon which the [F]irst [A]mendment is grounded-the promotion of a marketplace of ideas."" 7 As a Presidential
Commission on this subject has stated: "[t]here must be relatively
easy [public] access. . . for those who wish to promote their ideas,
state their views, or sell their goods and services .... This unfettered flow of information is central to freedom of speech... upon
which all of our other rights depend." l l8 "It is the purpose of the
First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas
in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by the Government itself
115 Id. at 1352.
116 Don R. LeDuc, "Unbundling"the Channels: A FunctionalApproach to Cable TVLegal
Analysis, 41 FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 14-15 (1988).
117 Erie Telecommunications, Inc. v. Erie, 659 F. Supp. 580, 599 (W.D. Pa. 1987),
afJ'd on other grounds, 853 F.2d 1084, 1103 (3d Cir. 1988). See also Berkshire Cablevision of Rhode Island v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976, 986-88 (D.R.I. 1983), vacated as moot,
773 F.2d 382, 386 (1st Cir. 1985).
118 1974 Cabinet Committee on Cable Communications, Report to the President, at
19.
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or a private licensee."'
It is a well-settled principle that "[e ] ach medium of expression
*

.

. must be assessed for First Amendment purposes by standards

suited to it." 2 "Each method of communicating ideas is 'a law
unto itself' and that law must reflect the 'differing natures, values,
abuses, and dangers' of each method."1 2 1 Thus, "[d]ifferent communications media are treated differently for First Amendment
purposes." 122
Cable television performs three separatefunctions, and differing
standards have governed these same functions elsewhere. The
three distinct functions that cable performs are retransmission of
broadcast signals, originationof the operator's own programs, and
carriage of programs not subject to the operator's editorial control
(leased and public access programs). Thus, cable television combines the characteristics of broadcast, print, and telephone in a single multi-channel medium. 2 This multifaceted nature prevents
the adoption of a traditional First Amendment standard.
"Gutenberg, Marconi, and Bell gave us three distinct communications technologies, and the law has responded with a trifurcated
communications system: print, broadcasting, and common
carriage." 124

The Supreme Court in Turne921 found that neither the broadcast model nor the print model was appropriate to analyze cable.
The broadcast model is not appropriate because the "unique physical characteristics" are not as restrictive as the "unique physical limitations of the broadcast mechanism." 126 On the other hand, in
rejecting the claim that the newspaper model should be employed,
the Supreme Court majority observed:
[T] he asserted analogy to Tornillo ignores an important technological difference between newspapers and cable television.
Although a daily newspaper and a cable operator both may en119

Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC., 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).

120 Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975).
12] Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 501 (1981) (footnote
omitted).
122 City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Comm., 476 U.S. 488, 496 (1986) (Blackmun,J.,
concurring). Compare, e.g., Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241
(1974) (newspapers) with FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984)
(broadcasting).
123 See Henry Geller & Donna Lampert, Cable, Content Regulation, and the FirstAmendment, 32 CATH. U. L. REv. 603, 629 (1983).
124 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERicAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-25 at 1003 (2d ed.
1988) (footnote omitted).
125 See supra notes 76-95 and accompanying text.
126 Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2456 (1994).
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joy monopoly status in a given locale, the cable operator exercises far greater control over access to the relevant medium. A
daily newspaper, no matter how secure its local monopoly, does
not possess the power to obstruct readers' access to other competing publications-whether they be weekly local newspapers,
or daily newspapers published in other cities. Thus, when a
newspaper asserts exclusive control over its own news copy, it
does not thereby prevent other newspapers from being distributed to willing recipients in the same locale.
The same is not true of cable. When an individual subscribes to cable, the physical connection between the television
set and the cable network gives the cable operator bottleneck, or
gatekeeper, control over most (if not all) of the television programming that is channeled into the subscriber's home. Hence,
simply by virtue of its ownership of the essential pathway for
cable speech, a cable operator can prevent its subscribers from
obtaining access to programming it chooses to exclude. A cable
operator, unlike speakers in other media, can thus silence the
27
voice of competing speakers with a mere flick of the switch.'
The majority in Turner also observed:
[A] ssuring that the public has access to a multiplicity of information sources is a governmental purpose of the highest order, for
it promotes values central to the First Amendment. Indeed, "it
has long been a basic tenet of national communications policy
that 'the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and2 8antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the
public."
The foregoing provides a strong basis to support the claim
raised on the second count in Kansas City,129 that public access
cable channels are constitutionally required.
B.

Educational and GovernmentalAccess without Public Access: The
Issue not Mentioned By the Court in Kansas City

Amici in the Kansas City case who supported the plaintiffs'
contentions also argued that the city could not eliminate access for
the public while maintaining access for itself. The decision does
not mention this position, which was subsumed by the major question of whether public access could be eliminated to silence speakers. The issue may arise, however, in circumstances where a public
127
128
129

Id. at 2466 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 2470 (quotation and citations omitted).
See supra notes 112-115 and accompanying text.
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access channel is eliminated for a reason other than to silence a
particular speaker or type of speaker.
The amici contended that public access must be continued to
prevent government from favoring one group of speakers over another. Government cannot grant to "one side of a debatable public question . . . a monopoly in expressing its views."1 30 The
Supreme Court has recognized that government efforts "to pick
and choose among the views it is willing to have discussed" is "censorship in a most odious form, unconstitutional under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments."1 3 Even in a non-public forum,
where distinctions can be drawn between speakers, the distinctions
132
must at least be reasonable.
In Kansas City, for example, the city did not eliminate all access to the cable system: it eliminated access for those with whom it
disagreed, leaving government and government-approved educators free to use the cable system for their speech.
It is hard to imagine any valid reason which could justify
wholesale exclusion of the public, given that the very purpose of
access channels (and the access channel provisions of the Cable
Act) is to provide for a for wide-ranging debate. Thus a substantial
question exists as to whether government has the Constitutional
and statutory authority to create "access" for a privileged few
33
speakers.
A court might conclude, nonetheless, that favored access by
the government is permissible. For example, in Common Cause v.
Bolger," 4 the franking privilege held by members of Congress has
been upheld despite claims that the subsidy to incumbents violates
the First Amendment rights of others to associate freely for the advancement of political beliefs and the Fifth Amendment guarantee
of equal protection under the law. 135 The defendants in that case
denied that the franking statute is constitutionally unsound, and
contended that the bounds of the franking privilege were drawn to
130 City of Madison Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 175 (1976).
131 Police Department v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 98 (1972) (quoting Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 536, 581 (1965)).
132 See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800, 806
(1985).
133 Cf Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1986)
(government grant of access to one selected speaker constituted impermissible content-based regulation of speech).
134 Common Cause v. Bolger, 574 F. Supp. 672 (D.D.C. 1982) (three judge panel),
affid, 461 U.S. 911 (1983).
135 Id. at 685.
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facilitate the fulfillment of the members' constitutional duty to
communicate with their constituents and, at the same time, to min1 36
imize any adverse effects on the political process.
The court held:
Although this case involves issues of access to the political process ....

the impact here is not upon defined political positions.

The lines drawn by the franking statute distinguish individuals,
not ideas. And because the individuals affected-non-incumbent congressional candidates-must be presumed to represent
the full spectrum of political ideology, we cannot hold that the
franking privilege creates any discrimination or restriction
which is content related. This case does not fall within the rationale for strict First Amendment scrutiny .... 137
If a similar test to evaluate government favoritism is applied in
the context of governmental access, the nature of the use of the
governmental access channel may be determinative. Thus, cablecasting of City Council meetings would be more likely to be found
permissible than would programming supporting a decision on the
location of a landfill or incinerator.
A passage in the majority's opinion in Turnersuggests that providing for "governmental" or "educational" access alone may be
sufficiently content-based to raise Constitutional concerns. The
majority opinion, most likely responding to the dissent, found it
important that Congress's purpose in enacting "must-carry" was
not to force "local" or "educational" programming, commenting:
The operation of the Act further undermines the suggestion that Congress' purpose in enacting must-carry was to force
programming of a "local" or "educational" content on cable subscribers. The provisions, as we have stated, benefit all full power
broadcasters irrespective of the nature of their programming....

Appellants do not even contend .

.

. that broadcast

programming is38 any more "local" or "educational" than cable
programming.'
C. Must The FranchisingAuthority Ensure That Access Is Funded
Adequately?
Adequate funding for access has been a difficult challenge in
136 In this regard, Congress limited the kind of mail that is frankable, excluding, for
example, mail "which specifically solicits political support" and "any mass mailing...
less than 28 days immediately before the date of any primary or general election....
See Common Cause, 574 F. Supp. at 675.
137 Id. at 681.
138 Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2462 (1994).
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the past. The challenge has become more significant as access
funding has to compete with other government uses for increasingly limited funds. The preceding constitutional analysis supports
arguments for adequate funding, although it will be difficult to
demonstrate that there is a constitutional requirement for government to ensure adequate funding. If it can be shown, however,
that the motivation for eliminating adequate funding arises from
disagreement with the content of programming on an access channel, there would be a substantial likelihood of obtaining relief. A
more difficult, but not impossible, task would be to convince a
court that had found access to be constitutionally required to further find that access can only be realistically available if adequately
funded.
CONCLUSION

The PEG access model has provided a forum for third-party
access to cable systems in many communities. That access has enabled a wide diversity of information sources to be available to the
public. As electronic communication becomes ubiquitous with deployment of the Information Superhighway, it is essential for the
preservation of free speech, as guaranteed by the First Amendment, that space be available on advanced telecommunication systems for use by the public and that such space be free from
unwarranted censorship. Committees in both houses of the 103d
Congress recognized that the role played by PEG access in providing an open forum for all users is a prototype that should be considered for the Information Superhighway.
For PEG access to serve as open public fora, access needs to be
available without control of content; any scheme that permits censorship must be subject to exacting scrutiny of whether a sufficiently compelling government interest was being furthered or
protected in the least restrictive manner reasonably available.

